models, we use sets of statements directly, Hintikka fashion. Again this gets some unnecessary machinery out of the way, making, we believe, the key features of the construction stand out. And it has one satisfying side effect that in the treatment of Kleene's three-valued logic, there is no third "truth value" of undefined. We have only the usual two truth values, but not every statement acquires a truth value. A minor point, but a satisfying one.
We must point out that none of the results here are new. A few items can definitely be ascribed to particular authors, most seem to be part of the mathematical folklore. Primarily we are attempting to provide a service: collecting this material in one place, and organizing it with Kripke's work in mind.
Monotone operators
Suppose we create an operator that takes as input a collection of assertions and produces as output the collection of "simple" consequences of these assertions. Such an operator is monotone in the sense that if we supply additional input, the output does not diminish. A special role is played by those collections of assertions that, when used as input, are returned unchanged as output. Such fixed points amount to collections of assertions that are complete, in that they already contain their consequences. The existence and variety of such fixed points play a fundamental role in Kripke's theory. And the mathematical machinery to deal with them can be presented most simply in an abstract, lattice theoretic setting.
Definitions
<D, <> is a partial ordering if < is a relation on D that is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. Throughout this section, we assume < is some fixed partial ordering on D. If A < B we say A is below B and B is above A. We also use the term between in the obvious way.
Let C c D. The largest member of C is an A G C such that B < A for all B E C. If C has a largest member, it is easily seen to be unique. Smallest has a dual definition.
Let 0 Φ C c: D. An upper bound for C is a member A of D such that B < A for all B G C. An upper bound for C need not be a member of C, nor need one exist at all. Lower bounds have a dual definition. Note that if C has an upper bound belonging to C, it is the largest member of C.
Again let 0 Φ C c D. If C has upper bounds, and among them there is a smallest, it is the least upper bound of C. If it exists it is unique, and is denoted by V C. Note that if C has a least upper bound then 2. A < B for all A e C => V C < B.
Greatest lower bounds have a dual characterization. The notation used is f\ C. If C has a greatest lower bound then 1. A GC=> /\C<A 2. B < A for all A e C => B < Λ C.
Let Φ: D -• D. Φ is monotone or order preserving if
The fundamental theorem in the subject is the following, due to Knaster [2] in a set theoretic context, generalized to the present extent by Tarski [5] . Proof: The proof of (2) is the dual of that of (1) . We only show (1) .
Let C = {X E D IA < X and Φ(X) < X}. By hypothesis, B E C so C is not empty.
Suppose XE C. Then A < X and Φ(X) < X By monotonicity, Φ(,4) < Φ(X) and Φ(Φ(X)) < Φ(X). By hypothesis, A < Φ(y4), hence ,4 < Φ(X). It follows that Φ(X) E C. Thus C is closed under Φ.
By hypothesis, /\ C E D. We claim it is the desired fixed point. Note that for allXE C, A <X, hence A< f\C. Also BeC,so/\C<B.
Thus ΛC is between v4 and B.
Suppose Xe C. Then Λ C < X By monotonicity, φίΛ C) < Φffl. But since XG C, Φ(X) < X, so Φl /\ C j < X Since X was an arbitrary member of C,Φ(ΛC)<ΛC.
It follows that Λ C E C. Since C is closed under Φ, φί Λ C j E C. Hence
ΛC<Φ(ΛC).
Thus, by antisymmetry, /\C is a fixed point of Φ. Finally, if Fis any fixed point extending A, F EC so /\C < F. Hence [\C is smallest.
Remark: This theorem is also the basis for a method of proof by "generalized induction" as follows:
Suppose the hypotheses of (1) are met. Let C E D and suppose we wish to show the smallest fixed point of Φ above A must be below C. This will be the case provided A < C whenever X < C then Φ(X) < C.
Reason: let C play the role of B in the Fixed Point Theorem. Since C < C the second condition implies Φ(C) < C. Then the smallest fixed point of Φ above A is guaranteed to be below B, that is, below C in this case.
More Definitions
As before <D, <) is some fixed partial ordering. 
Proof:
(Cl) Let G be a nonempty subset of D. We show /\ G exists in D. Define E to be the set of lower bounds of G. Since D is assumed to have a smallest member, E is not empty. <E, <) is also a partially ordered set, where < is the original ordering restricted to E.
We show that E contains, with each chain, the least upper bound of that chain. Well, let C be a chain in E. By the hypotheses of Theorem 2.2, C has an upper bound, and hence a least upper bound in D. That is, \f CGΌ. Let YG G. For each XeC,X<Y, hence \/C<Y. Since Y was arbitrary, V C G E. Since E is a partially ordered set in which each chain has an upper bound, E has maximal members, by Zorn's Lemma. Let Mbea maximal member of E. We claim M is actually the greatest member of E.
Let A be some member of E. Let Y o be some member of G (which must exist since G is nonempty 
Thus Mis the greatest member of E.
E is the set of lower bounds of G, and E has a greatest member, so G has a greatest lower bound.
(C2) Suppose A < Φ(A). This time let E = {X G D | X < Φ(X)}. Since A < Φ(^4), A is in E. As before, <E, <> is also a partially ordered set, where < is the original ordering restricted to E.
We claim every chain in E has an upper bound in E. Let C be a chain in E. Then of course C is a chain in D too, so V C G D. Now suppose X E C.
Then X < \J C so by monotonicity, Φ(X) < φί Vcj. Since iGCςE, X<Φ(X). Hence X < φ(\f cY for every XG C. Thus \JC<φ(\JcY so VCisinE.
Since E is a partially ordered set in which each chain has an upper bound, each member of E, in particular A, can be extended to a maximal member of E, by Zorn's Lemma.
Let M be a maximal member of E. We claim M is a maximal fixed point of Φ in D. Since MGE,M< Φ(M). By monotonicity, Φ(M) < Φ(Φ(M)), hence Φ(M) E E. Since M is maximal in E, it follows that M = Φ(M), hence Mis a fixed point. Further, if Fis any fixed point of Φ, trivially FζΞ E. But M is maximal in E, so F cannot properly extend M. Thus M is a maximal fixed point. We have shown C2.
(C3) By assumption, D has a smallest member; we denote it by 0. Since 0 is below every member of D, of course 0 < Φ(0). Then by C2, 0 can be extended to a maximal fixed point. This establishes C3.
(C4) Suppose A < Φ{A). By C2, Φ has maximal fixed points above A; let B be one of them. Then also A < B and Φ(B) < B. By part (1) 
is in the collection E defined in the proof of C2. Also ME E, and it must be maximal in E for, if not, it could be extended to a maximal member of E which, by the argument earlier, would be a maximal fixed point for Φ, and would properly extend M. Since Mis maximal in E, and M< V U, Af}, it follows that M= V {/, Λf}. Since /< V U> M ) then /< M. And since M was an arbitrary member of M, / < [\ M.
Conversely, suppose / is a fixed point of Φ and / < /\ M. We show / is intrinsic. Let F be any fixed point. Then F E E, so F can be extended to a maximal member M of E. M is a maximal fixed point of Φ by the argument earlier, so M E M. Then F <M and / < f\ M < M, so / and F have a common upper bound, M. Since F was arbitrary, /is intrinsic. smallest fixed point of Φ extending A will be below /\ M, hence will be intrinsic by C7.
Saturated sets
Kripke's aim is the creation of a theory that contains its own truth predicate. Tarski's construction, under the assumption of the existence of such a truth predicate, of a paradoxical statement asserting its own falsehood, makes the simple attainment of this goal impossible. Kripke's "out" is to allow some statements (the paradoxical one just referred to, for instance) to lack truth values. That is, there can be truth-value gaps. The question is, what rules must the assignment of truth-values to statements follow. Kripke considered several alternatives. We take up two in this section: Kleene's (strong) three-valued logic [1] , and van Frassen's supervaluations [6] .
Rather than work with a valuation, a function from statements to truth values, we find it more convenient and more elegant to follow Hintikka's tradition and work with a set of statements instead. Intuitively the set consists of those statements a valuation would make true, if we had valuations. And we adopt Smullyan's device [4] of signed statements: prefixing a statement with T or F, which in fact is suggested by Kripke himself in footnote 24 of [3] . So, if S is a set of signed statements, it determines a mapping to truth values as follows: For a statement X, if TXeS,X maps to true; if FXeS, X maps to false; if neither TX nor FX is in 5, X lacks a truth value. Notice that, in this approach, there is no special "undefined" truth value; lacking a truth value simply means that no truth value has been assigned. Now the issue is: what closure conditions do we want to impose on a set S of signed statements to reflect our understanding of language and truth? Technical details follow.
For the rest of this section, L is a fixed first-order language with an infinite set of constant symbols. For simplicity we assume formulas are built up using Λ, ~, and V. We use statement to mean a formula of L with no free variables. A signed statement is an expression of one of the forms TX or FX, where X is a statement, and Γand .Fare two fixed additional symbols.
Definitions
Let S be a set of signed statements. 
Note: These definitions are somewhat different than those generally in the literature. In our use, the set of all signed statements is saturated, though not consistent.
Let D be the collection of all sets of signed statements. ^ is the usual subset relation. <D, c) is a partial ordering closed under greatest lower bounds (Π) and least upper bounds (U).
Let A be a set of signed statements. We define a map Φ^: D -> D as follows: Then by the Fixed Point Theorem 2.1(1), Φĥ as a smallest fixed point extending A.
Definition
We have shown that, for a set A of signed statements, there is a smallest upward saturated set extending A. We call it the upward saturated closure of A, and denote it by A υ . Remarks: This corollary, essentially due to Hintikka, is the basis of most tableau completeness proofs. One attempts to find a tableau proof by systematically doing everything possible. If no proof is found, the process generates a downward saturated, atomically consistent set, from which a suitable model can be produced using Corollary 3.8. Smullyan [4] presents this style of proof in an elegant fashion. Nonetheless, model sets, since they assign truth values to all statements, will not suit our purposes. We want the weaker notion of consistent, saturated set. Let P(x) and Q(x) be two predicate symbols of L. 
T(Vx)P(x) F~ (VJC)P(JC)
F~ (v*)P(x)Λ(V*)β(*). Proof:
On the other hand, it is also easy to check that neither T(\fx)Q(x) nor
(1) Every model set is upward saturated, and it is easy to check that the intersection of upward saturated sets is upward saturated. Similarly for consistency.
(2) A u is the smallest upward saturated set extending A, and hence is a subset of the upward saturated set A v . v meets the conditions of Kleene's three-valued logic [1] .
Just as we did with A u , we may use A v to define a partial truth valuation. This time we get one meeting the conditions of van Frassen's supervaluations [6] . We continue to work with sets of signed statements, though, rather than with partial valuations.
The Kripke construction
We need a first-order language capable of supporting the machinery to code its own syntax. The details are not critical. For definiteness we use a language of arithmetic.
For this section let L be the first-order language with 0, 1, 2,.. .as constant symbols, +, * as function symbols, and = and T as relation symbols (T is 1-place). T is intended to play the role of a truth predicate.
If X is a statement of L that does not contain T, we say X is true or false if X is true or false in the standard model for arithmetic, under the obvious interpretation. The problem is to assign truth values to statements containing T.
If X is a statement of L, r X n is the Gόdel number of X, under some standard Gόdel numbering.
Kripke essentially works with extension-antiextension pairs <Si, S 2 > where formulas in Si are "true", formulas in S 2 are "false", and formulas left out have no truth value. As Section 3 suggests, we prefer working with the set of signed formulas {TX\X e SJU {FX\X G S 2 } This is, of course, a simple variant, but it does allow connections with other parts of formal logic.
Let A be the set of "atomic arithmetic truths". That is, if A" is an atomic statement of L not containing T, then if X is true, TX E A, and if X is false,
FX<ΞA.
Note that both A u and A v are completely determined by the signed atomic statements they contain. Thus we can confine members of D in the following to the atomic level, which allows us to use the same D for both U and V completions.
Let D consist of all sets S of signed atomic statements of L (including those involving T) such that: l.AcS 2. S is (atomically) consistent. <D, <Ξ) is a partial ordering, where <Ξ is the usual subset relation. D is closed under Π but not under U, since the union of consistent sets need not be consistent. However, it is straightforward to check that <D, Q) satisfies the conditions of the Main Theorem 2.2. A itself is the smallest member.
Next we define two operators Φu and Φ v on D, corresponding to the two notions of closure defined in the previous section. We take them one at a time.
For S G D
Let SGΌ. S consists of signed atomic statements, hence is trivially downward saturated, and atomically consistent by definition. Then S υ is saturated and consistent. Since AςSit follows easily that all true signed statements of arithmetic are in
1 ) \FXE S υ } is atomically consistent. Certainly A is atomically consistent. Since the members of A do not contain T, these sets do not involve common statements, so the union, Φf/(S), is atomically consistent. Φυ(S) extends A by definition. Then Φu(S) is a member of D.
We showed in Proposition 3. 
The same argument as above shows that where S is the smallest fixed point of Φ σ . Neither a statement asserting its own truth nor a statement asserting its own falsehood is grounded.
Kripke calls a statement paradoxical if it has no truth value in S u for any fixed point S of Φu. A statement asserting its own falsehood is paradoxical; a statement asserting its own truth is not. Since every fixed point can be extended to a maximal fixed point (by Theorem 2.2(C2)), one can equally well say a paradoxical statement is one that has no truth value in M u for any maximal fixed point M of Φ σ . Thus the maximal fixed points play a significant role, but there is no reason to single one out as being more fundamental than the rest.
There is no largest fixed point. There is, however, a largest intrinsic fixed point (by Theorem 2.2(C8)). Kripke calls a statement intrinsic if it has a truth value in I u for some intrinsic fixed point / of Φy. This is equivalent to saying it has a truth value in B u where B is the largest intrinsic fixed point of Φ^. One might wonder about the relationships that entail between the fixed points of Φ σ and Φ v . There are a few easy results to be had here.
First we note that, for each 5, Φu(S) <Ξ Φy(S). This follows immediately from Proposition 3.9 and the definitions of Φ v and Φ v . Proof: Let S be a fixed point of Φ F . Let <D, <Ξ) be the partial ordering defined earlier in this section. Let Έ = {AEΌ\A<Ξ:S}.
Then <E, c=> is also a partial ordering. But E has a largest member, S. Trivially, then, every nonempty subset of E has an upper bound, namely 5, and it follows that it has a least upper bound.
Suppose A e E. Then ^ς5,so Φc/C4) £ Φ^S) c Φ K (S) = 5. Thus E is closed under Φ^.
S G E, hence Φ^S) e E, and so Φc/(S) £ S. Now by the Fixed Point Theorem 2.1(2), Φ^ has a largest fixed point below 5.
Remark: By this proposition, any maximal fixed point of Φ^ has a largest fixed point of Φ υ below it. Suppose it could be shown that any maximal fixed point of Φ v has a maximal fixed point of Φy below it. Then it could also be shown that the largest intrinsic fixed point of Φ^ is a subset of the largest intrinsic fixed point of Φ v .
Approximating fixed points
In Kripke's paper, and in many papers based on it, the existence of a smallest fixed point of a monotone operator is established by using a transfinite sequence of approximations from below. We have chosen not to base our development on this method. Nevertheless, it does provide one with a good feeling for the character of the smallest fixed point. It is a limited technique in that there may be fixed points not obtainable by this method. It does, however, apply to the largest intrinsic fixed point, in a "dualized" form. In this section we sketch the method, partly to make contact with other papers, partly because many people seem unfamiliar with the dual version.
For this section we suppose <D, <) is a partial ordering satisfying the hypotheses of the Main Theorem 2.2, and we assume Φ is monotone.
Let A be a sound member of D, that is, A < Φ(A). We define a transfinite sequence of members of D, indexed by ordinals, as follows.
A 0 =A A a+ι = Φ(A a )
A λ = \J {A a I a < λ} for limit ordinals λ. This is an increasing sequence in the sense that A a < A a+{ for all a. The proof is by (transfinite) induction on a.
Case 0: A o < A x says A < Φ(v4) which is true since A is sound.
Successor case: Suppose A a < A a+i .
Then by monotonicity, Φ(A a ) < Φ(^4 α+1 ) which says that A a+i < A a+2 .
Limit case: Suppose λ is a limit ordinal and, for each a < λ, A a < A a+Ϊ . Choose an a < λ. By definition of A λ9 A a < A λ . Hence Φ(A a ) < Φ(A λ ) or A a+Ϊ < v4 λ+1 . Using the induction hypothesis, it follows that A a < A λ+X Since a was arbitrary, V {A a | a < λ} < ^χ+i» °r ^λ ^ ^λ+i Remark: Another way of stating this is that every member of the sequence is sound.
Thus the A a sequence is weakly increasing. Suppose we write < to mean < but not =. We certainly cannot have that the sequence is strongly increasing (A a < A a+Ϊ ) 9 because it would follow that all members of the sequence are distinct. But then there would be as many as there are ordinals, while all are members of the set D, a clear impossibility. Then, for some α, we must have A a = Φ(A a ); some member of the sequence is a fixed point.
Incidentally, once a fixed point turns up in the sequence, the sequence remains constant from that point on.
Suppose F is a fixed point of Φ extending A. Then A o < F of course. Say A a < F. Then A a+ι = Φ(A a ) < Φ(F) = F, so A a+ι < F. Say A a < F for every a <λ. It follows immediately that A λ < F. Then by induction again, every member of the sequence is <F. Since F was arbitrary, it follows that the fixed point the sequence eventually hits on is the smallest fixed point extending A.
If we start with the smallest member of D, we will have a sequence of approximations, from below, to the smallest fixed point of Φ.
Next we sketch a dualized version of this. Choose a member B E D such that Φ(B) < B. This time define a sequence as follows. This time it can be shown that the sequence is decreasing, B a+ ι < B a , and that it eventually settles on the largest fixed point of Φ below B. We leave the argument to the reader.
If we start with /\ M, where M is the set of maximal fixed points of Φ, the sequence converges to the largest intrinsic fixed point.
One sometimes thinks of the terms in the A a sequence earlier as stages in a "learning" process that goes on transfinitely long, though not forever. Then the terms in the B a sequence are probably best thought of as stages in a "forgetting" process. The smallest fixed point, being below the largest intrinsic fixed point, it follows that in these processes one cannot forget more than one learns. This seems like a comforting point at which to conclude.
